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Thomas Kasulis wears his erudition lightly, but he is one of the most original 
comparative philosophers writing today. He has an unrivaled gift for the 
illuminating metaphor and for demystifying Japanese philosophy. In this 
creative and diagram-filled book, he offers a philosophical approach to the 
question of cultural differences that will be accessible to the general reader. 
His proposal is that the differences between cultures reflect the particular 
aspects of human life that cultures tend to emphasize, enhance, and place as 
central. “What is foreground in one culture may be background in another” 
(p. 20). Such an approach avoids the absolutely crippling idea that different 
cultures operate according to different logics or live in different worlds and 
therefore could serve as an invaluable propadeutic to comparative philosophy 
of religion. 
 
Kasulis proposes two basic cultural orientations, which he labels 
“intimacy” and “integrity.” A culture’s basic choice between these two 
orientations is then reiterated in its approaches to epistemology, styles of 
argument, metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, and politics, thereby generating 
broad and mutually supportive cultural patterns. Here are two examples of the 
ways in which Kasulis traces these patterns out. An orientation of integrity 
in epistemology tends to seek publicly verifiable, objective knowledge. The 
knower maintains his or her own integrity in relation to the known object; 
each exists independently of the other. An orientation of intimacy, on the other 
hand, tends to see the knower and known in an interdependent relationship, 
and this approach leads to an appreciation of the kind of esoteric knowledge 
that one can only obtain through a particular practice or training. Kasulis 
illustrates this with the good example of the knowledge of a gymnastics 
judge. Intimate knowledge, then, is not fully public (unlike knowledge in the 
integrity approach), though it is still objective. As a second example, acting 
ethically from an orientation of integrity tends to focus on the agent’s responsibility: 
one ought to respect the integrity and so the rights of others. Acting 
ethically from an orientation of intimacy, on the other hand, tends to focus 
on the agent’s responsiveness: it involves developing the ability or skill to 
feel the pain of others. In general, then, Kasulis’s point is that although one’s 
cultural orientation may shape one’s world view, so that what is commonsense 
from one orientation may seem inscrutable or beside the point from another 
perspective, the orientation that a culture does not follow can nevertheless be 
appreciated and accessible as a background or underemphasized aspect of its 
own world. The two are not incommensurable conceptual schemes but rather 
complementary gestalts, and moving from one to the other requires not so 
much analysis as imagination. 
 
Kasulis thus sees philosophical reflection on culture as an entree to human 
experience and he sees philosophy itself as a cultural enterprise, and in my 
judgment these are fruitful roads for the future of philosophy of religion. If I 
have a criticism, then, it is of the places where I judge Kasulis “takes sides” 
and tacitly privileges one orientation over the other. According to this book’s 
premise, one’s worldview, epistemology, and so on are dependent on one’s 
cultural orientation. But Kasulis is a Western philosopher who has made the 
linguistic turn, and he seems for this reason to hold to a dualism of mind (or 
language) on the one hand and the “external” world on the other, a dualism 
that for him is culturally invariant. Thus the reader finds him speaking of 
the mind, Cartesian-style, as an “inner” realm; one has immediate access to 
one’s own mind but only mediated access to the minds of others (p. 45). 
Similarly, whether one experiences the world from the integrity perspective 
or the intimate perspective, Kasulis assumes that all experience is mediated 
through language. As a consequence, Kasulis insists on a dualism between 
the modes of logic and those of reality. “There is no necessary connection 
between the way we think and the way reality is” (p. 99; cf. pp. 88–89, 134, 
153–157). Unlike, for example, Aristotle, who said for eternal things, to be 
possible and to be are the same, Kasulis insists on a Kantian split between 
the way things are thought and the way they are in reality. “[A] consequence 
of this view is that ‘metaphysics’ in either orientation is understood to be 
only a form of discourse” (p. 154; emphasis added). This word/world division 
reflects an integrity orientation in which our knowledge of reality is not 
intimate knowledge, but Kasulis treats it as a truth that is independent of 
one’s cultural orientation. As he admits, the book is closer to an orientation 
of integrity than one of intimacy (p. 161). 
 
What Kasulis does not imagine (and, granted, on this point he is today 
in the mainstream) is a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge in which 
knowledge arises in the process of embodied engagement with the world. 
There is no space in a review even to sketch such a theory, though I recommend 
The Embodied Mind (MIT Press, 1992) by Francisco Varela and his 
colleagues and Warren Frisina’s The Unity of Knowledge and Action (SUNY 
Press, 2002). And resources for a nonCartesian understanding of knowledge 
can also be found in Kasulis’s book. As mentioned above, Kasulis makes 
the interesting point that, from the intimacy orientation, there is an internal 
relation, an “overlap,” between knower and known, so that each is partially 
dependent on the other. “For intimacy the world is not what it would be 
without its knowers” (p. 81). As an example of human knowers’ influence 
on the world, Kasulis points to the artificial things in the world like buildings 
that are artifacts of human activity. The nonartificial world is also human 
shaped, Kasulis says, since it is perceived via the artifact of human language; 
“language is part of the world-as-experienced” (p. 83). These are good points, 
but one can go further, because the contribution of the knower to the world 
does not wait on language. The world is disclosed to any organism in terms of 
its purposes, as Merleau-Ponty details; a dog therefore lives in a dog world, 
but this is not the result of language. Moreover, the perceiver contributes 
to the experience of the world, both in terms of what are sometimes called 
secondary characteristics (since there is no color without seeing eyes) and 
in terms of body schemas. (This is the thesis of George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson’s Philosophy in the Flesh [Basic Books, 1999].) Perhaps Kasulis 
would welcome these supportive suggestions, but they pull his argument out 
of his linguistic fence into an appreciation of an embodied, world-intimate 
consciousness. 
 
Kasulis’s sketch of the intimacy and integrity orientations is detailed and 
yet vague enough (in a good sense) to be a powerful heuristic device. The two 
orientations will suggest many applications to scholars of religion: not only to 
comparisons between East and West, but also between feminine and masculine 
or between premodern and modern ways of being religious. Philosophers 
of religion may also find that they shed light on differences between Catholic 
and Protestant piety or within a single church between mystical and doctrinal 
interests. The book is proffered as a tool, and it will be useful for a variety 
of classes, not only in philosophy but also where questions of cross-cultural 
understanding are central. 
